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Abstract
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition.
Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when compe-
tition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing
on participation when bid-preparation is costly, counteracting the aim to stimulate
competition. For multiple auctioneer’s objectives mentioned in directives, we derive
optimal mechanisms, which differ due to different evaluation of the tradeoff between
participation and bid-preparation costs. Thus, the auctioneer needs to decide on an
objective. However, reducing bid-preparation costs improves the optimal values of
multiple objective functions.
Keywords: auction, participation, market design, optimal mechanism, renewable
energy support
JEL: D82, Q48, D47, D44
1. Introduction
A specter is haunting the world of auctions, especially in the energy sector – the
specter of endogenous rationing. In multi-unit auctions with endogenous rationing,
bids do not only determine the prices but also the auction volume, i.e., how much is
auctioned. This paper analyzes multi-unit procurement auctions with endogenous
rationing in an environment of costly participation and single-unit supply. Addition-
ally, we derive optimal mechanisms for different auctioneer’s objectives that have
been announced in markets in which auctions with endogenous rationing are used.
Procurement auctions find a growing number of applications throughout differ-
ent fields in both industry and public procurement. Since the auctioneer buys goods
∗We thank members of the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Department
III B 5, Renewable Energies in the Power Supply System, as well as Silvana Tiedemann and
members of the AURES II consortium for helpful discussions.
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or services, it is vital to ensure the offers’ quality or seriousness. The auctioneer
therefore often requests a certain kind of project preparation as a requirement for
participation. To fulfill these requirements, bidders have to undertake costly mea-
sures, i.e., firms have to invest in their project even before they know whether they
can actually realize it.1 We call these costs bid-preparation costs. Only firms whose
expected profit from the auction covers their bid-preparation costs will participate
in the auction.
A worldwide large and growing field of application of multi-unit auctions with
costly bid-preparation are auctions for renewable energy support, whose yearly total
award prices reach a twelve-figure dollar amount.2 In these auctions, bid-preparation
costs play an essential role and are substantial. They mainly arise because bidders
have to meet physical requirements by submitting a (partial) approval for building
a plant on a specific site (Wigand et al., 2016; Mora et al., 2017). For onshore wind
projects, the costs of the physical requirements are between two and ten percent of
the invested amount (Wallasch et al., 2015; Quentin, 2015; Kitzing and Wendring,
2016). The field of auctions for renewable energy support became very large and
is still growing because, for example, the State Aid Guidelines of the European
Commission (2014) make auctions obligatory for all new support schemes for which
member states wish to obtain state aid approval. To achieve the ambitious develop-
ment goals for renewable energy, the auctioned volumes must increase.3 However,
this demand for new renewable energy sites requires a correspondingly high supply.
Since May 2018, the auctions for onshore wind in Germany experienced either an
under-subscription or a narrow over-subscription (BNetzA, 2019). Similar trends
can be seen in other countries such as Brazil and France (Robert and Simon, 2019).
Due to the lack of competition in these auctions, (almost) all submitted bids were
successful and prices increased to the level of the reserve price. This development
questions the use of auctions. They were introduced to provide support at market-
1Typically, the required measures are also necessary for realizing a project. Such measures are
for example the development of a prototype in the industry sector or the collection of construction
permits in the building sector.
2Worldwide, an estimated total capacity of 111 gigawatt of renewable energy was auctioned in
2017–2018 (IRENA, 2019). For estimating the monetary value, we set an average price of USD
50 per MWh, an average duration of support of 20 years, and an average of 2000 full load hours
per year (mix of different renewable energy sources). This leads to a monetary value of USD 222
billion in 2017–2018.
3Transforming the world’s energy systems toward affordable and clean energy is one of the
sustainable development goals that all United Nations Member States adopted in 2015 (United
Nations, 2015). One of the main measures to achieve this goal is to increase the share of renewable
energy in the energy mix. For example, Germany plans to increase the share of renewable energy
in the gross power consumption to 65% by 2030 (BReg, 2019a).
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based payments, to allocate support efficiently, and to learn about the cost develop-
ment in a competitive environment of renewable energy production. However, now
the concern arises that in future auctions all participating projects’ support will be
equal to the reserve price, although the costs are lower and there is a belief that
more projects with lower costs would be feasible.
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been suggested as a solution to the
problems of low competition and high auction prices (IRENA, 2015; Mu¨ller, 2018;
BReg, 2019b). Endogenous rationing means that the auction volume is adapted
to the observed supply according to pre-specified rules. It is supposed to generate
competition and, thus, keep prices low by preventing that all bidders win even if
the number of bids is below the number of goods. Two concepts of endogenous
rationing are in the focus: auctions with endogenous volume adaption and auctions
with endogenous reserve price.
In auctions with endogenous volume, the final auction volume is reduced below
the original auction volume if the number of bids is low. For example, the auction
may stipulate that only a pre-announced share (e.g., 80 %) of the original auction
volume will be awarded to bidders if the total bid volume does not exceed the origi-
nal auction volume. In this case, the highest 20 % of bids will not win. This kind of
rationing will be applied for example in Germany (BReg, 2019b), France (Ministre
de l’Europe, 2018), and Ukraine (Legislation of Ukraine, 2019). Similar measures
are applied in Brazil (IRENA, 2015), Greece (Papachristou et al., 2017), Kaza-
khstan (Abylkairova, 2018), Mexico (Jime´nez, 2016), and Switzerland (Bundesamt
fu¨r Energie, 2019).
In the second approach – the auction with endogenous reserve price – the sub-
mitted bids determine a reserve price below the original reserve price. Only bids
below the endogenous reserve price are successful. Variations differ in the way the
bids determine the endogenous reserve price, e.g., by the bids’ mean or median.
Endogenous reserve prices are applied in France (Ministre de l’Europe, 2019) and
Peru (Comite´, 2015).
Our analysis applies to markets in which preparing a bid is costly. A firm par-
ticipates in the auction only if her expected profit from the auction exceeds the
bid-preparation costs. Introducing endogenous rationing hits exactly this sensitive
point of an auction with costly bid preparation. By ensuring that there will always
be at least one losing bidder – the property that motivates its application – endoge-
nous rationing removes any participation incentive for the weakest bidder, causing
any bidder that expects to be the weakest participant to stay out. As a result, there
may be no participation incentive for any firm.
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Our theoretical analysis reveals that endogenous rationing has a strong negative
effect on participation. Whereas many countries discuss or decided to introduce
endogenous rationing, there is little experience with it because it has not yet been
implemented or applied repeatedly or the data are not available. An example of
an auction with endogenous volume adaption that has been conducted for several
years is the auction for the support of energy efficiency projects and programs in
Switzerland (Bundesamt fu¨r Energie, 2019). This auction indeed experienced a
relative decrease in the bid volume after the introduction of the rationing rule.
Proponents of endogenous rationing posit that it ensures against undesirable
extreme auction outcomes. In the context of renewable energy auctions the desire
for such insurance may originate in the following two facts. First, the heterogenous
community of political decision makers pursues multiple objectives such as maximiz-
ing social welfare and minimizing costs at the same time. Second, the social value
of renewable energy plants is not clearly defined.4 In Section 4, we define the four
most prevalent objectives for procurement auctions and derive for each objective
the optimal mechanism. The optimal mechanisms for the two common objectives
to maximize the auctioneer’s surplus or social welfare can each be implemented in
two ways. One design is an auction with an optimal reserve price. In the other
design, all participants are paid their bid-preparation costs for participating in an
auction with a (lower) reserve price. Both designs incentivize the same participation
in the auction. This participation differs from the participation in auctions with en-
dogenous rationing, which therefore are not optimal with respect to these two main
objectives.
The fact that it is optimal to (implicitly or explicitly) refund the bid-preparation
4 Kreiss et al. (2019) point out that the State Aid Guidelines of the European Commission
(2014), which are the superior directive for the support of renewable energies in the European
Union, stipulate related but different goals. Their prioritization is however unclear. Among these
goals are the minimization of the support payments and the minimization of the overall costs to
achieve the renewables expansion goals. The ambiguity between these two goals is also found in
the German law (BReg, 2017). The minimization of the support payments is stipulated, e.g., in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and also proposed for developing countries, in some cases as
stand-alone objective without referring to the expansion goal. The minimization of the overall costs
to achieve the expansion goal is stated, e.g., in California (US) and Mexico (Kreiss et al., 2019;
IRENA, 2013). Minimizing the overall (social) costs is related to maximizing the social welfare,
which is also a goal in national laws (e.g., BMU, 2016; BReg, 2017; Kazakh Government, 2009).
Implementing this goal requires determining a monetary value of renewable energy, which, however,
is missing in the laws and directives. The maximization of the consumer surplus or low prices for
the customers are also postulated (e.g., BMU, 2016; IRENA, 2013; Hochberg and Poudineh, 2018;
Kreiss et al., 2019). A further goal is to achieve the targeted expansion of renewable energy,
which implies meeting the demand in the renewable energy auctions. This goal is stated, e.g., in
Germany, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Mexico, and also proposed for developing countries (BReg, 2017;
Kazakh Government, 2009; Hochberg and Poudineh, 2018; IRENA, 2013).
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costs emphasizes their influence on the market outcome. Indeed, we find that low-
ering the bid-preparation costs increases competition and improves the auctioneer’s
surplus and social welfare. In the context of renewable energy auctions, current
press reports and governmental statements suggest that lower bid-preparation costs
can be achieved by simplifying preparation procedures and by taking measures to
reduce the number of legal disputes that delay or prevent projects.
This paper is related to the literature on sales auctions with variable supply
and to the literature on auctions with bid-preparation costs. Several works analyze
auctions with variable supply whereas, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to analyze auctions with endogenous rationing. Damianov and Becker (2010)
analyze sales auctions with variable supply, in which the monopolistic seller chooses
an optimal auction volume given the bids. This models a practice commonly applied
in treasury auctions, in which the auction volume or the rule to determine the auction
volume is not fixed before the auction (Nyborg et al., 2002). This practice originates
in the wish to avoid low-price equilibria. Since bidders in treasury auctions have
multi-unit demand and are allowed to submit non-increasing demand functions, they
have an incentive to coordinate on low-price equilibria by strategically reducing their
demand. Damianov (2005) and Damianov and Becker (2010) show that the seller
can eliminate low-price equilibria by adjusting the supply to the demand.
There are crucial differences between treasury auctions and auctions for renew-
able energy support as well as between the ex-post supply adjustment and endoge-
nous rationing as analyzed in this paper. Supply adjustment and endogenous ra-
tioning differ in that supply adjustment permits that all bids are successful whereas
the motivation for endogenous rationing is to assure that there is at least one losing
bid. In particular, in a price-discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction with supply ad-
justment an optimizing monopsonist would accept all bids below his constant item
value. In contrast to auctions for renewable energy support, treasury auctions are
offered frequently, some even on a daily basis. Bidders repeatedly demand multiple
units of the good and their bid-preparation costs are insignificant. In renewable
energy auctions and other procurement auctions, projects are awarded that will be
realized exactly once, most of the bidders participate with only one project,5 and
their bid-preparation costs are crucial. There is often only one or very few chances
for a bidder to win.6
5The percentage of single-project bidders in renewable energy auctions is often above 90%
(BNetzA, 2019). One reason is that usually for each project a legally independent project company
is founded.
6Renewable energy auctions usually take place at most a few times a year and re-participation
entails further costs due to, e.g., rescheduling of the project or renewal of permissions.
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Several works investigate standard auctions with bid-preparation costs and vol-
untary participation in single-unit settings where bidders learn their private infor-
mation before deciding on participation. Stegemann (1996) shows payoff equivalence
of the symmetric equilibria of the second-price auction and the pay-as-bid auction.
He, as well as Tan and Yilankaya (2006) and Celik and Yilankaya (2009) also analyze
asymmetric equilibria and asymmetric mechanisms whereas our analysis focuses on
symmetric equilibria in symmetric mechanisms. Samuelson (1985) derives the so-
cially optimal reserve price and the auctioneer’s surplus-maximizing reserve price.
Li and Zheng (2009) find empirical evidence for predictions of the model, for ex-
ample, a lower entry probability of bidders when the number of potential bidders
increases. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) derive an optimal (revenue-maximizing)
sales mechanism. Their optimal mechanism, translated into a procurement setting,
refunds the bid-preparation costs to all participating bidders and conducts a second-
price auction with a reserve price equal to the highest costs of a participant, the
cutoff type. We contribute to this literature by extending the analysis to multi-unit
auctions and by providing a unifying view. Our results imply that the auction with
surplus-maximizing reserve price by Samuelson (1985) implements the same optimal
mechanism as the one by Menezes and Monteiro (2000) and that Samuelson’s so-
cially optimal reserve price is one way to implement the socially optimal symmetric
mechanism.
2. Basic Model
We consider a multi-unit procurement auction for k units of a good, k ≥ 1. The
set of potential bidders consists of n risk-neutral firms each with single-unit supply,
n ≥ 1. We consider both n ≤ k and n > k because endogenous rationing has
been suggested in particular for auctions with low or even no competition. Firms
are symmetric and have independent private costs for supplying the good. The
firms’ private costs x1, x2, . . . , xn are independently drawn from the distribution F
with density f and full support on [x, x], 0 ≤ x < x¯. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and
x−i = (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Furthermore, let F(k,n) denote the distribution
function of the k-th lowest of n independent signals and let X(k,n) denote the asso-
ciated random variable. Thus, F(k,n−1) =
∑n−1
i=k
(
n−1
i
)
F (x)i(1− F (x))n−1−i if n > k,
and we define F(k,n−1) = 0 if n ≤ k.
Our model of a multi-unit procurement auction follows the approach of Samuel-
son (1985) for a single-unit procurement auction. Firms simultaneously decide on
their participation in the auction and on their bidding strategy. The bidding strat-
egy is relevant only if the firm participates because only participating firms can bid
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and win in the auction. We consider only pure strategies. Let m denote the number
of firms that participate in the auction. Clearly, m ≤ n.
To participate in the auction, each firm has to incur bid-preparation costs c > 0,
e.g., to meet qualification requirements set by the auctioneer. These are sunk costs
for the firms when the auction starts and they are not paid to the auctioneer. A
firm knows c and her private costs xi when she decides about her participation. If
firm i participates in the auction, she has an expected profit pi(xi) from the auction.
Her profit from the auction is p − xi if she wins a good at the payment p and is
zero, otherwise. Firm i aims to maximize her expected payoff Π(xi) from the game,
where Π(xi) = pi(xi)− c if she participates in the auction and Π(xi) = 0 if she does
not participate.
Our analysis, which comprises many multi-unit procurement auction formats,
assumes the following properties:
(P1) The n firms simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the auction
and commit to a bid if they participate. Thus, when bidding, the firms know
n but do not know m.7
(P2) Bids may not exceed a reserve price r ∈ R+, r > x+ c, set by the auctioneer.8
(P3) The k lowest bids win if m ≥ k (ties at the k-th lowest bid are broken ran-
domly); all other firms obtain nothing. If m < k, all m bids win.
(P4) The reserve price r is the maximum payment from the auction, and for each
firm there exists a bid such that the firm’s payment with this bid is r if m ≤ k.
(P5) Participating firms apply a symmetric bidding function β(xi, r). If n > k,
β(xi, r) is strictly increasing in xi. If n ≤ k, β(xi, r) is weakly increasing in
xi. Let β(x, r) = (β(x1, r), β(x2, r), . . . , β(xn, r)). A symmetric equilibrium
β(x, r) exists.
An auction with properties P1–P5 is called standard auction (STD auction). STD
auctions comprise sealed-bid procurement auctions with different payment rules: the
pay-as-bid auction in which all winning bidders receive their bids, and the uniform-
price auction in which the lowest rejected bid determines the price that all winning
bidders receive.9 P3 and P5 imply that the goods are supplied by the firms with the
7This assumption is in line with the actual auctions for renewable energy support in Germany,
where the number of admitted pre-registered firms n is known, but the number of participating
firms m is unknown. Menezes and Monteiro (2000) prove revenue equivalence of first- and second-
price auction with known (i.e., revealed participation) and unknown number of bidders in the
single-unit sales auction with bid-preparation costs.
8If r < x+ c, no firm will participate in the auction.
9Dynamic auctions that each are equivalent to one of the sealed-bid auctions are the descending-
clock (English) auction or the ascending-clock (Dutch) auction (Krishna, 2010).
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lowest costs, i.e., the allocation is efficient conditional on the participating firms.
However, according to P1 and P3, it is possible that not all k goods are supplied,
even if the costs of k or more firms are below r. This is because the preparation
costs c prevent all firms with costs xi above a cutoff cost level xˆ from participating
in the auction.10
Denote by iˆ a firm whose costs are at the cutoff costs xˆ. Firm iˆ submits the
highest bid, which wins only if a maximum of k − 1 other firms bid. Therefore, she
adjusts her bid to these cases and bids to ensure the payment r in case she wins.
For example, in the pay-as-bid auction, iˆ’s optimal bid is β(xˆ, r) = r, whereas in
the uniform-price auction β(xˆ, r) = xˆ (or, weakly dominated, β(xˆ, r) = r). If xˆ < x¯,
firm iˆ is indifferent between participating and not participating, and the cutoff costs
xˆ are uniquely determined by Π(xˆ, r, c, n) = 0, where
Π(xˆ, r, c, n) = (r − xˆ) (1− F(k,n−1)(xˆ))− c
= (r − xˆ)∑min{k,n}−1i=0 (n−1i )F (xˆ)i(1− F (xˆ))n−1−i − c . (1)
The cutoff costs xˆ determine a firm’s ex-ante participation probability F (xˆ). The
following lemma collects properties of F (xˆ). A proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1. For a firm’s ex-ante participation probability F (xˆ) the following hold:
• F (xˆ)
< 1, if n > k or r < x¯+ c ,= 1, otherwise.
• dF (xˆ)
dr
> 0 and dF (xˆ)
dc
< 0 if n > k or r < x¯+ c.
F (xˆ) increases in k if n > k. F (xˆ) decreases in n if n ≥ k.
Under mild conditions we have xˆ < x¯, that is, high-cost firms do not participate.
If n > k, no reserve price can induce full participation because type x¯’s profit from
the auction is zero if all firms participate. If n ≤ k, each bid wins but the high-cost
firms forgo the auction if the reserve price does not cover their supply costs and
bid-preparation costs.
The intuition behind the reaction of a firm’s ex-ante participation probability
F (xˆ) and the cutoff xˆ to changes in r, k, c, and n in Lemma 1 is as follows. Increasing
the reserve price or (if n > k) the number of goods increases the marginal bidder’s
expected profit from the auction via an increased profit in case of winning or an
10A cutoff level xˆ that separates participating firms with costs xi ≤ xˆ from non-participating
firms with xi > xˆ exists because P5 implies pi(xi) > pi(xj) for xi < xj in equilibrium. If this did
not hold, firm i could profitably deviate by bidding like the higher-cost firm j.
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increased winning probability. This results in higher cutoff costs xˆ, which implies
a higher expected number of participants E[m]. Bid-preparation costs c have to be
absorbed by the expected profits from the auction. Therefore, a higher c lowers the
cutoff level. A growth of the pool of firms reduces the marginal bidder’s expected
profits from the auction if n ≥ k. Thus, xˆ decreases in n.11
The cutoff type xˆ is the same in all STD auctions and she is the worst-off type
among the participants. Payoff equivalence holds for all STD auctions.12
Lemma 2. STD auctions are payoff equivalent.
That is, in a symmetric equilibrium, a firm with costs x has the same expected
profit in all STD auctions and the auctioneer has the same expected surplus in all
STD auctions. The symmetric bidding equilibrium in a pay-as-bid auction is, for all
x ∈ [x, xˆ],
βPaB(x, r) =
(1−G(xˆ))r + ∫ xˆ
x
yg(y)dy
1−G(x) = x+
(1−G(xˆ))(r − xˆ) + ∫ xˆ
x
1−G(y)dy
1−G(x) ,
where G(x) = F(k,n−1)(x). A symmetric bidding equilibrium in the uniform-price
auction is βUP (x, r) = x for all x ∈ [x, xˆ]. Lemma 2 and the equilibria are proven
in the appendix.13
If there is no competition, n ≤ k, the equilibrium payment of STD auctions
equals r, either because all bidders bid r in anticipation of the low number of bids
or because the payment rule determines a uniform payment of r.
Instruments of endogenous rationing have been suggested as a means to avoid
high payments in cases with n ≤ k. However, the next section shows that the
negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation in all cases of n and k is
sufficient to erase any desired effect on payments.
3. Endogenous Rationing (ER)
In this section, we incorporate instruments of endogenous rationing (ER) into the
STD auctions of Section 2. When we compare auctions with ER (ER auctions) and
auctions without ER (STD auctions), we assume the same reserve price r, number
of goods k, number of firms n, and payment rule, unless specified otherwise.
11Li and Zheng (2009) find empirical evidence of this “entry effect”: a negative relationship
between the number of potential bidders n and the participation probability.
12See Stegemann (1996)and Menezes and Monteiro (2000) for payoff equivalence between single-
unit first- and second-price auctions with bid-preparation costs.
13In a descending clock auction, β(x, r) = x for x ∈ [x, xˆ] is a firm’s optimal exit price.
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ER auctions have properties P1, P2, and P5. They violate P4 because they are
designed to prevent an auction price r when n ≤ k. They also violate P3: albeit the
lowest bids win, less than m bids win if m ≤ k and less than k bids may win even
though more bids have been submitted. Thus, ER auctions assign goods differently
than STD auctions and give a different payment to the worst-off type. Therefore,
payoff equivalence to the STD auctions fails (e.g., Krishna, 2010, Section 3.2.2).
ER auctions share some basic properties of STD auctions, e.g., a bidder’s prob-
ability of winning increases if she reduces her bid and a winning bidder is paid at
least her bid. They differ from STD auctions in that the auction volume is variable.
As an important consequence, there will always be at least one losing bidder in the
auction (if at least one firm participates and there is no volume floor), irrespective
of the relationship between k and n. This is a crucial property if participation is
costly.
Auctions with endogenous volume and with endogenous reserve price can have
different properties. In auctions with endogenous reserve price, decreasing a bid
can even reduce the auction volume, whereas with endogenous volume, the auction
volume depends on the number but not on the size of the bids. However, some
endogenous reserve price rules, like quantile rules, can be translated into endogenous
volume rules.
3.1. Endogenous Auction Volume (EAV)
One option to endogenously ration the awards is an endogenous adaption of the
auction volume to the number of bidders, which we refer to in short as endogenous
auction volume (EAV). Concretely, if m bids are submitted, the number of winning
bids is determined according to a commonly known function
κ(m)

= k if m > µ¯ ,
< min{k,m} if µ < m ≤ µ¯ ,
= m if m ≤ µ .
The integer parameters µ and µ¯ with 0 ≤ µ < k ≤ µ¯ mark the limits of the
range of the number of bids m in which the original auction volume min{k,m}
is reduced. For the actual auction volume κ(m) holds κ(m) < κ(m + 1) for all
m ∈ {µ, µ + 1, . . . , µ¯ − 1}. Payments in the EAV auction are determined as in the
related STD auction. For example, in an uniform-price auction, the κ(m) winning
bidders are paid the (κ(m) + 1)-th lowest bid.
Examples of EAV auctions are planned auctions for innovation tenders in support
of renewable energy sources in Germany. 80 % of the original volume will be awarded
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to bidders if m ≤ k (BReg, 2019b). Thus, κ(m) = d0.8me if m ≤ µ¯ = k and,
implicitly, µ = 4, i.e., κ(m) = m if m ≤ 4.14,15
The endogenous rationing of the auction volume intends on keeping the payments
low in case of low supply. However, the endogenous volume adaptation creates a
strong adverse effect on participation.
Proposition 1. In an EAV auction with volume k and limit µ, the cutoff costs xˆ
and the participants are the same as in a STD auction with the auction volume µ.
Thus, even if an EAV auction puts a much larger volume out to tender than a
STD auction, the expected number of bids may be the same in both auctions.16
The participants are determined by the cutoff costs xˆ, and these are the same
in the EAV auction with volume k and in the STD auction with volume µ. In the
EAV auction, the bidder with the cutoff costs xˆ submits the highest bid and will win
only if the total number of bidders is not above µ. Otherwise, the limited number
of goods (k < m) or the rationing (κ(m) < m) prevents her from receiving a good.
Because her bid wins only if she faces no competition, her payment is r (depending
on the payment rule, either because she bids r or because the uniform price is equal
to the reserve price). Therefore, she has the same expected profit as from a STD
auction with the auction volume µ (see (1)) and participates if and only if
(r − xˆ)
min{µ,n}−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
F (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−1−i − c ≥ 0. (2)
This proves Proposition 1.
Comparing the EAV auction with an original (maximal) volume k and the STD
auction with volume k with respect to the expected number of participants (i.e.,
bids), number of goods awarded, expected price(s), and bidders’ profits (payoffs)
yields the following results. The expected number of participating firms is lower
in the EAV auction than in the STD auction because the cutoff costs are lower.
The expected number of goods awarded is lower because fewer bids are expected
14According to the rule in Germany, no bid volume is cut in parts but the last winning bid is
fully awarded. This results in an implicit volume floor of µ = max{m : d0.8me = m} = 4. Unlike
in our model, bid volumes may be heterogenous. Then, the lower bound on the number of winning
bids can vary, but at least one bid will win.
15The abrupt switch from the volume k when m = k + 1 to the volume 0.8k when m = k could
be avoided by changing µ¯ to 1.25k, i.e., κ(m) = d0.8me if m ≤ 1.25k.
16Referring to the 80 %-rule of Germany’s auctions for innovation tenders, which implies µ = 4,
this result suggests a small number of projects awarded in these auctions because in Germany’s
renewable energy auctions, which are conducted as STD auctions, the number of projects awarded
is usually above twenty (BNetzA, 2019).
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and it is possible that the number of bids falls in between µ and k, such that the
volume is reduced. With uniform pricing, in both EAV and STD auctions, bidders
bid their costs. The expected cost of the price-determining bidder and, thus, the
expected payment to each winning bidder is lower in the EAV auction than in the
STD auction. Hence, the winning bidders’ expected profits (payoffs) are lower in the
EAV auction than in the STD auction. Since the payoff equivalence theorem applies
to different EAV auction formats, these results also hold for the pay-as-bid auction
and other auctions like the uniform-price auction in which the highest accepted bid
determines the uniform price.17
Swiss Case
The Swiss auction for energy efficiency projects and programs implements a bud-
get auction with EAV (Bundesamt fu¨r Energie, 2019). The auctioneer announces a
budget for the auction. If more than 120 % of the announced budget is demanded
by the bidders, the announced budget is awarded. If less than 120 % of the an-
nounced budget is demanded, then the awarded budget is reduced to 83.33 % of the
demanded budget. The EAV rule has been introduced in 2013. Since 2013, the
relative demand (ratio of demanded budget to announced budget) has continuously
decreased (see Figure 1).18
3.2. Endogenous Reserve Price (ERP)
An endogenous reserve price (ERP) is derived from the submitted bids.
In the first step, the firms decide about their participation. Then, participating
firms submit their bids, which may not exceed the default reserve price r. The
bids of the m ≤ n participating firms are denoted by b = (b1, b2, . . . , bm). Next,
the ERP %(b) is calculated on the basis of b, where mini∈{1,...,m}{bi} ≤ %(b) ≤
maxi∈{1,...,m}{bi} and 1 ≥ ∂%(b)∂bi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For the award, only
bids b < %(b) are taken into consideration, or alternatively, b ≤ %(b) and b <
17If µ = 0, no firm participates and payoff equivalence applies trivially. If µ > 0, xˆ is the same in
these auctions as in the (lowest-rejected-bid) uniform-price auction. Participants are in an auction
with bidders’ types distributed i.i.d. on [x, xˆ]. In all auctions, the bids of the same lowest-ranked
types win in a symmetric monotone equilibrium for all x, and the expected payoff of the worst-off
type xˆ is the lowest payoff that incentivizes participation, c. Thus, payoff equivalence applies.
18Figure 1 shows the development over the years of the demanded budget and the awarded
budget relative to the announced budget for projects and programs in total. There are separate
announced budgets for projects and programs plus, until 2014, a third budget for the best projects
or programs that are not awarded under their respective specific budget. In 2015, a second auction
round and budget for projects has been introduced. The total announced budget increased from
9 million Swiss francs in 2010 to 50 million Swiss francs in 2018. The awarded budget can exceed
the announced budget because the last project is fully awarded.
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Figure 1: Development of the relative demanded and awarded budgets in the Swiss auction for
energy efficiency projects and programs
maxi∈{1,...,m}{bi}.19 We call these accepted bids and denote their number by m′,
m′ ≤ m. The payment rule is applied as if only the accepted bids were submitted
and as if the ERP was the reserve price.20
We complement the ERP rule by a floor µ and a ceiling µ¯, with 0 ≤ µ < k ≤ µ¯.
(The case of no floor or ceiling is included by µ = 0 or µ¯ =∞, respectively.) Floor
and ceiling override rationing. If m ≥ µ > m′, then the µ lowest bids win (with
random tie-breaking) and the reserve price equals the highest of the winning bids.
If m ≤ µ or m > µ¯, all bids are accepted and the payment rule is applied with the
reserve price maxi∈{1,...,m}{bi} or r, respectively.
We focus on ERP rules with the property that for all bi ∈ (x, x¯) there exist
combinations of the other bidders’ bids b−i such that
∂%(b)
∂bi
> 0. Examples for
ERP rules %(b) are the mean rules that determine the ERP based on the mean of
the submitted bids, %(b) = α 1
m
∑m
i=1 bi with α ∈ (0, 1], and the median rules that
determine the ERP based on the median of the submitted bids, %(b) = α·median(b)
with α ∈ (0, 1].21
19To enforce rationing if n ≤ k or m ≤ k, the ERP winner-determination rule must prevent that
all bids win if all bidders bid the same, e.g., r. This is met by both forms of the ERP rule.
20That means, if m′ ≤ k, in the uniform-price auction, the price is equal to %(b).
21A different auction with median-price rule is the Medicare auction analyzed by Cramton et al.
(2015) and widely criticized by auction experts (see http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-
2014/further-comments-of-concerned-auction-experts-on-medicare-bidding.pdf, accessed
09/16/2019). One of the reasons why the Medicare auction was predicted to perform badly is
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With an ERP, it is not an equilibrium that all bidders bid r.22 Therefore, we
focus on symmetric and strictly increasing bidding functions (P4) and assume the
existence of an equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies.
Proposition 2. In an auction with ERP %(b), the cutoff costs xˆ and the partici-
pants are the same as in a STD auction with the auction volume k = µ.
A firm iˆ with the cutoff costs xˆ receives a good if and only if the number of bidders
m is µ or less. If m > µ, her bid will not win because the other bidders submit lower
bids, and thus, firm iˆ’s bid biˆ = maxi∈{1,...,m}{bi} is not below %(b). If m ≤ µ, firm
iˆ’s bid wins and, furthermore, determines %(b) and, therefore, her payment. Thus,
firm iˆ participates and bids biˆ = r iff (2) holds. This proves Proposition 2.
The fact that firm iˆ’s decision problem is the same in an EAV auction as in an
ERP auction reveals a parallelism between the two instruments. If µ > 0, then
xˆ > x, and all firms with xˆ ≥ xi ≥ x participate in the auction. If the ERP
is a quantile of the bids, then there is an EAV rule under which the same firms
win and their payments are the same. For example, the median rule for the ERP
corresponds to an EAV of 50 %.23 However, there are also differences, where the ERP
rules do not correspond to any EAV rule. Consider, for example, the ERP that is
equal to the mean. With this rule, an additional bid can increase or decrease the
number of winning bidders, which is impossible under an EAV rule. Furthermore,
in the uniform-price auction, bidders have an incentive to bid above their costs
because an increase in their bid may increase the ERP and may therefore increase
their payment. In contrast, bidders cannot influence their payment in the uniform-
price EAV auction, in which it is optimal for the bidders to bid their costs. Payoff
equivalence does not hold for different auctions (e.g., pay-as-bid vs. uniform pricing)
with the same ERP rule because different payment rules may determine different
sets of winners due to the differences in the bidding strategies.
This paper identifies low participation as a detrimental effect of endogenous
rationing. Auctions with ER may also be plagued by strategic manipulations. ERP
that it is not ex post individually rational in that winning bidders’ payments can be below their
bids: the k lowest bids win and the median of the winning bids is the payment to each winner.
All auctions that we analyze are ex post individually rational. Further differences to our setting
are that in the Medicare auction bids are non-binding, bids have to be above a bid floor (assumed
to be below x and necessitated by the incentives evoked by the design), and bid-preparation costs
are absent.
22Only if the bidders knew that m ≤ µ, all bidders bidding r would be an equilibrium.
23Concretely, the median rule with α = 1 that chooses the higher of the two middle values in
case of an even number of bids as the ERP (i.e., ρ(b) = b(d0.5me) where b(j) denotes the j-th lowest
bid) corresponds to the 50 %-EAV rule that rejects the bid at the 50 % boundary in case of an odd
number of bids (i.e., κ(m) = b0.5mc).
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auctions are susceptible to actions that artificially increase supply in order to profit
from a higher probability of award and higher prices. A firm may participate with a
serious bid and with an additional bid (either because multiple bids are feasible or
under a different identity) that equals the reserve price to increase the probability
of an award for the serious bid. The bid-preparation costs reduce the attractiveness
or availability of such strategic supply expansion. Auctions with ER have further
unfavorable properties. For example, with any form of ER, i.e., also with EAV, the
average payment may increase when the number of bids increases.
4. Conflicting Objectives for Optimal Auction Design
The main reason for the suggestion of endogenous rationing (ER) is the sup-
posed insurance against undesirable extreme outcomes, e.g., prices at the level of
the reserve price (i.e., the highest possible price) in case of lack of competition (i.e.,
n ≤ k). In the context of renewable energy auctions this is also because the auc-
tioneer (i.e., the heterogenous community of political decision makers) often pursues
multiple objectives that are not compatible (see Footnote 4). In this section, we em-
phasize the necessity to prioritize or weight the objectives. We will illustrate this by
comparing different objectives typically brought forward in procurement auctions.
We discuss four ex-ante objectives, which are prevalent in procurement auctions,
particularly those organized by the government or other public institutions:
O1 Maximize the auctioneer’s expected surplus Π0
O2 Maximize the expected social welfare W (minimize the expected social costs)
O3 Maximize the expected number of goods awarded Ka, given k
O4 Minimize the auctioneer’s expected payments for goods awarded
O1 and O2 require that prior to the auction the auctioneer assigns a value to ac-
quiring goods. For example, in an auction for renewable energy support, the govern-
ment’s value for a good is the social value of the energy produced by the renewable
energy plants. We assume that every acquired unit of the good has the same value
v and that c+ x < v, so that the production of the goods increases social welfare.
An optimal auction with O1 maximizes the auctioneer’s expected surplus Π0.
His expected surplus with the uniform-price rule (and any payoff-equivalent rule) is
Π0 =(v − r)
∑min{k,n}
i=1
(
n
i
)
iF (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−i
+ k (v − E[X(k+1,n) |X(k+1,n) ≤ xˆ])F(k+1,n)(xˆ) .
(3)
An optimal auction with objective O2 maximizes the expected social welfare,
which is equivalent to minimizing the expected social costs. In contrast to the auc-
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tioneer’s surplus, the social welfare takes the firms’ costs instead of the award prices
into account. The components of the social welfare are the bidders’ participation
costs, the auction winners’ costs to produce the good, and the auctioneer’s value for
every good awarded. The expected social welfare W is given by
W =− ncF (xˆ)−∑min{k,n}i=1 E[X(i,n)|X(i,n) ≤ xˆ]F(i,n)(xˆ)
+ v
(
min{k, n} −∑min{k,n}−1i=0 (min{k, n} − i)(ni)F (xˆ)i(1− F (xˆ))n−i) . (4)
According to objective O3, the auctioneer aims to acquire as many as possible
of the demanded goods k. The expected number of goods awarded Ka reveals how
well an auction achieves this aim, where Ka ≤ k. Ka is given by
Ka =

∑k−1
i=1
(
n
i
)
iF (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−i + kF(k,n)(xˆ) if n > k ,∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
iF (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−i if n ≤ k . (5)
The auctioneer’s objective O4 is to minimize his expected payments, Ka multi-
plied by the average price. We include this objective because it has been brought
forward (see Footnote 4). However, it is an implausible objective (see also Proposi-
tion 3 (O4)).
Proposition 3 presents optimal auctions for objectives O1 to O4. The uniform-
price auction in the proposition could be replaced by any payoff equivalent auction.
Proposition 3 is proven in the appendix.
Proposition 3. An optimal symmetric mechanism for objective Oj,
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, can be implemented by
(Mr) a uniform-price auction with an optimal reserve price rOjr or
(Mc) a uniform-price auction with a refund of c for all participating firms and an
optimal reserve price rOjc .
The optimal cutoff type xˆOj is unique and is the same in Mr and Mc. The optimal
cutoff type xˆOj and reserve prices rOjr and r
Oj
c are the following.
O1 Assume x+ F (x)
f(x)
is increasing.
If n > k or v < x¯+ 1
f(x¯)
+ c Otherwise(
v − xˆO1 − F (xˆO1)
f(xˆO1)
) (
1− F(k,n−1)(xˆO1)
)− c = 0 xˆO1 = x¯
rO1r = v − F (xˆ
O1)
f(xˆO1)
rO1r = x¯+ c
rO1c = xˆ
O1 rO1c = xˆ
O1
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O2 If n > k or v < x¯+ c Otherwise
(v − xˆO2) (1− F(k,n−1)(xˆO2))− c = 0 xˆO2 = x¯
rO2r = v r
O2
r ≥ x¯+ c
rO2c = xˆ
O2 rO2c ≥ xˆO2
O3 If n > k Otherwise
xˆO3 = x¯ xˆO3 = x¯
rO3r does not exist r
O3
r ≥ x¯+ c
rO3c = xˆ
O3 rO3c ≥ xˆO3
O4
xˆO3 = x
rO3r ≤ x+ c
rO3c ≤ x+ c
Proposition 3 enables us to compare the mechanisms that achieve objectives O1
to O4. In case of no competition (n ≤ k) and a sufficiently high value v, objectives
O1 to O3 are achieved by either mechanism Mr or Mc by choosing the lowest reserve
price that incentivizes all firms to participate. In particular, these objectives are not
achieved by excluding bidders, like endogenous rationing does. Only objective O4
is achieved by Mr or Mc with a reserve price that prevents any participation.24
In a competitive market (n > k) or if v < x¯+c, the optimal cutoff type to achieve
a specific objective is the same whether one implements Mr or Mc. However, the
four objectives ask for different cutoffs. The optimal reserve prices rr and rc, if they
exist, have the same order as the cutoff types.
Corollary 1 summarizes these relationships. It shows that achieving all objectives
with the same auction design is impossible. In particular in a competitive market
or if the value v is sufficiently low, each objective requires a specific auction design
that is incompatible with the optimal design for other objectives.
Corollary 1. Assume x+ F (x)
f(x)
is increasing. If n ≤ k and v ≥ x¯+ 1
f(x¯)
+ c then
• xˆO3 = xˆO2 = xˆO1 = x¯ > xˆO4 = x,
• rr = x¯+ c and rc = x¯ achieve O1, O2, and O3 but not O4.
24In order that rO4r and r
O4
c exist, we deviate from assumption (P2) and allow r ≤ x+ c.
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Figure 2: Reserve price rO1r , cutoff costs xˆ
O1, and their sum xˆO1 + rO1r = v when xi
i.i.d∼ U [0, 1],
v = 1, and k = 3. LHS: c = 0.05 and n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. RHS: n = 6 and c ∈ [0, 0.15].
If n > k or v < x¯+ c then
• xˆO3 > xˆO2 > xˆO1 > xˆO4,
• rO2r > rO1r > rO4r , and rO3c > rO2c > rO1c > rO4c .
In case of low competition, the optimal mechanism aims at maximizing (for
O1 to O3) or minimizing (for O4) participation. The case of strong competition or
sufficiently low value v involves trade-offs between participation and bid-preparation
costs. In the following paragraphs, we take a closer look at this case.
In Mc, the fixed payment of c induces participation by all firms with x ≤ xˆ and
the reserve price rc = xˆ guarantees that firms with x > xˆ do not participate.
25
In an optimal mechanism Mr, the relationship between the reserve price and the
cutoff type is more complex. For the reserve price rO1r and cutoff xˆ
O1 that maximize
the auctioneer’s surplus it holds that v > rO1r > xˆ
O1 > x. The optimal reserve price
depends on the optimal cutoff, which varies with the number of firms. If n increases,
xˆO1 decreases, and rO1r increases or decreases depending on whether the reverse
hazard rate F (x)/f(x) decreases or increases. In any case, by the assumption that
x + F (x)/f(x) increases, xˆO1 and rO1r diverge when n increases. The same applies
to the effect of the costs c on reserve price and cutoff type. Figure 2 illustrates
these properties of xˆO1 and rO1r , using a uniform distribution F on [0, 1]. With this
distribution, the optimal reserve price and cutoff value add up to the auctioneer’s
value
rO1r + xˆ
O1 = v − F (xˆ
O1)
f(xˆO1)
+ xˆO1 = v.
25For k = 1, Menezes and Monteiro (2000) derive the optimal auction of type Mc for objective
O1.
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To attract socially optimal participation, the reserve price is set equal to a good’s
value.26 Intuitively, at rO2r = v, the auctioneer’s expected marginal value, v(1 −
F(k,n−1)(xˆO2)), equals the total costs of the marginal bidder, c+xˆO2(1−F(k,n−1)(xˆO2)).
Although the expected number of goods awarded Ka is important both for the
auctioneer’s expected surplus and the expected social welfare, it is obvious that the
optimal reserve price for maximizing Ka is the highest possible reserve price that
does not exclude bidders from the auction. In a competitive market this can be
achieved only by a mechanism Mc.
On the contrary, the reserve price that minimizes the auctioneer’s payments is
as low as possible in order to exclude bidders, to prevent any award, and to pay
nothing. Clearly, this outcome is typically not pursued by an auctioneer. Thus, O4
is not a reasonable primary objective. Objective O4 may instead be subsumed under
objective O1 because the auctioneer’s surplus involves the sum of his payments.
Concluding, the four objectives conflict and cannot all be achieved with one
reserve price. The optimal surplus is achieved with less participation than is socially
optimal: the optimal reserve price rOSr is below the value of a good, which, however,
is the optimal reserve price for O2. In contrast, O3 calls for a higher reserve price
that avoids excluding bidders, which can only be achieved with a mechanism Mc.
Objective O4 requires a reserve price below the firms’ costs. These considerations
show that, while it is possible to design the auction optimally for specific goals, it is
impossible to create a panacea in form of a design that is optimal for multiple goals.
5. Policy Implications
The ER auctions do not achieve any of the three reasonable objectives O1 to
O3. Assuming an auction with ER is the optimal choice, what may an auctioneer’s
objective look like? In the STD auctions, a firm will be successful if her costs are
sufficiently low to participate and are among the k lowest costs. In an auction with
ER, a firm’s success in addition depends on how many other firms’ costs are suf-
ficiently low to participate. The auctioneer buys few goods if few costs are below
the level for participation and competition is weak. He buys many goods and ex-
presses a higher willingness to pay if competition is fierce. With an ER auction, the
auctioneer adjusts to the competition level: in good times he is willing to pay more
than in bad times. In an auction conducted by a government, like the renewable
energy auctions, it is more likely that the auctioneer’s aim is to govern the market
26For k = 1, Samuelson (1985) identifies the optimal reserve price rO2r = v. For the same set-
ting, Stegemann (1996) shows that asymmetric equilibria of the second-price auction can improve
efficiency.
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than to adjust his willingness to pay to the market situation. Moreover, is it really
wanted that there are less than k winners if all bidders bid x in an auction with
EAV or if one bidder bids x and all others bid x+ ε in an auction with ERP?
The optimal mechanisms point at the relevance of the bid-preparation costs.
Indeed, reducing these costs supports the auctioneer’s objectives O1 to O3.
Proposition 4. The auctioneer’s surplus (O1), social welfare (O2), and the num-
ber of goods awarded (O3) in the respective optimal mechanism increase if the bid-
preparation costs decrease.
Proposition 4 is proven in the appendix. Given an optimal mechanism Mr, reduc-
ing the bid-preparation costs increases competition because lower bid-preparation
costs increase each firm’s participation probability and the number of participants.
Given an optimal mechanism Mc, lower bid-preparation costs allow reducing refund
payments to participants and total bid-preparation costs without changing partici-
pation. Therefore or after adjusting the respective optimal mechanism to the lower
c, the auctioneer’s surplus, social welfare, and the number of goods awarded increase.
In our framework, a straightforward policy implication of Proposition 4 is to
reduce the bid-preparation costs. Even if the objectives are in conflict, this mea-
sure contributes to three different objectives. Thus, any factors that unnecessarily
increase bid-preparation costs should be eliminated. Such factors include admin-
istrative or formal obstacles that increase bid-preparation costs but cannot be in-
fluenced by bidders. For example, bid-preparation costs for onshore wind projects
in Germany lie between two and ten percent of the invested amount although the
auctions’ participation requirements are the same for all bidders (Wallasch et al.,
2015). The costs of meeting the requirements differ due to different measures bidders
need to take and different obstacles they face. One of the reasons for the stagnating
development is the rigorous refusal of onshore wind projects by part of the citizens
(Quentin, 2019). Legal disputes on projects can increase bid-preparation costs dra-
matically. The German federal government advocates a compensation of citizens
in order to reduce this rejection (ZEITonline, 2020), which would in turn reduce
bid-preparation costs. Of course, as in this example, any measure that reduces the
bid-preparation costs has to take the costs for its implementation into account. Fur-
thermore, a measure that reduces bid-preparation costs by mitigating participation
requirements would have to consider potential detrimental effects on project qual-
ity. Hence, it is not advised to abrogate the participation requirements that cause
the bid-preparation costs, but to find a reasonable balance between entry barriers
that ensure the seriousness of bids and attractive conditions for participating in the
auction.
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6. Conclusion
Endogenous rationing has been suggested as a means to increase competition
in case of low participation in auctions. However, according to the analysis in this
paper its primary effect in auctions with costly participation is a strong reduction
of participation. As a consequence, endogenous rationing is not a component of
optimal auctions.
The optimal auctions to maximize the auctioneer’s surplus, social welfare, or the
number of goods awarded differ if the number of potential bidders is high. Thus,
the auctioneer then needs to prioritize objectives. If the number of potential bidders
is lower than the number of goods and the auctioneer values the goods sufficiently
high, the optimal auction is the same for the three objectives. The auctioneer then
needs to maximize participation, which he can do by setting a sufficiently high
reserve price and/or by refunding the bid-preparation costs. A policy measure that
contributes to all three objectives with any number of potential bidders – supposing
it absorbs its implementation costs and has no detrimental effect on project quality
– is to reduce bid-preparation costs.
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Appendix A. Proofs
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x)) = −n(n−1
k
)
F (x)k(1− F (x))n−k−1 (A.1)
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(i− k)F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x)) =
k∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
iF (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i
(A.2)
Proof of Lemma 3: We will use the identities
(
n
i
)
i = n
(
n−1
i−1
)
and
(
n
i
)
(n− i) = n(n−1
i
)
(A.3)
and the binomial theorem
∑n
i=0
(
n
i
)
F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i = (F (x) + 1− F (x))n = 1 . (A.4)
25
Proof of (A.1) via simplifying a telescoping sum.
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x))
=
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
(iF (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i − (n− i)F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1)
=
(A.3)
n
(∑k
i=1
(
n−1
i−1
)
F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i −∑ki=0 (n−1i )F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1)
= n
(∑k−1
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1 −∑ki=0 (n−1i )F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1)
= −n(n−1
k
)
F (x)k(1− F (x))n−k−1
Proof of (A.2) via induction. For k = 1, n(1 − F (x))n−1 = n(1 − F (x))n−1, which
proves the base case. For the induction step assume (A.2) holds for k. Now look at
k + 1.
∑k+1
i=0
(
n
i
)
F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x))(i− k − 1)
=
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x))(i− k)
−∑ki=0 (ni)F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1(i− nF (x))
=
IH
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
iF (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i −∑ki=0 (ni)iF (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i−1
+
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
nF (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1
= −∑ki=0 (ni)iF (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1 +∑ki=0 (ni)nF (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1
=
∑k
i=0
(
n
i
)
(n− i)F (x)i(1− F (x))n−i−1
=
∑k+1
i=1
(
n
i−1
)
(n− i+ 1)F (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i
=
∑k+1
i=1
(
n
i
)
iF (x)i−1(1− F (x))n−i

Proof of Lemma 1: Note that F (xˆ) < 1 iff xˆ < x¯ and that F (xˆ) increases iff xˆ
increases.
First we show that xˆ < x¯ if n > k or r < x¯+c. If a firm with costs x¯ participates,
the other n−1 firms also participate. If a firm with costs x¯ is wins a good, it receives
a payment of r by (P4). A firm with x¯ wins a good with probability 0 if n > k
and with probability 1 if n ≤ k. A firm participates iff its expected profit from
participating is non-negative. Thus, if n > k, a firm with x¯ does not participate
because (r − x¯) · 0 − c < 0. If n ≤ k, a firm with x¯ does not participate iff
(r − x¯) · 1− c < 0.
If, to the contrary, n ≤ k and r ≥ x¯+c, then the expected payoff of the worst-off
type x¯ is positive, r − x¯− c ≥ 0, and all firms participate, xˆ = x¯ and F (xˆ) = 1.
26
To prove the remaining properties, consider the expected profit of the firm iˆ who
receives a good only if no more than k − 1 other firms participate if n > k or who
receives a good for sure if she participates if n ≥ k. Her expected profit is (see (1))
Π(xˆ, r, c, n) = (r − xˆ)(1− F(k,n−1)(xˆ))− c (A.5)
=
(r − xˆ)
∑k−1
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
F (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−i−1 − c if n > k
r − xˆ− c if n ≤ k.
Since firm iˆ participates only if Π(xˆ, r, c, n) ≥ 0 and since c > 0, it follows that
xˆ < r.
If not all firms participate (xˆ < x¯), firm iˆ is indifferent between participating
and not participating in the auction. Since firm iˆ is indifferent if and only if her
expected profit from participating is zero, the cutoff costs xˆ are determined by
Π(xˆ, r, c, n) = 0 . (A.6)
There exists a unique xˆ that fulfills (A.6), since the derivative of (A.5) with respect
to xˆ is negative for all xˆ ≤ r:27
∂Π(xˆ, r, c, n)
∂xˆ
=

−∑k−1i=0 (n−1i )F (xˆ)i(1− F (xˆ))n−i−1
−(r − xˆ)k(n−1
k
)
f(xˆ)F (xˆ)k−1
(
1− F (xˆ))n−k−1 if n > k
−1 if n ≤ k
< 0 . (A.7)
To determine how xˆ depends on r and c, we apply the implicit function theorem.
With (A.6) and (A.7) we get
dxˆ
dr
= −
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂r
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂xˆ
= −
∑min{k,n}−1
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
F (xˆ)i
(
1− F (xˆ))n−i−1
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂xˆ
> 0 ,
dxˆ
dc
= −
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂c
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂xˆ
=
1
∂Π(xˆ,r,c,n)
∂xˆ
< 0 .
The cutoff costs xˆ increase in k if n > k because the probability in (A.5) increases
in k.
Further, xˆ decreases in n if n ≥ k. For given xˆ, the probability of getting a
27The second term of the derivative stems from simplifying a telescoping sum (see Lemma
3(A.1)).
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good in (A.5) decreases in n because F(k,n−1)(xˆ) < F(k,n)(xˆ). Take the xˆ that fulfills
(A.6) for n firms. All firms with x < xˆ would have a positive expected payoff from
behaving like the firm with xˆ. If there were n + 1 firms and the firm with costs xˆ
was the cutoff type, its probability of getting a good would be lower and the payoff
in (A.5) would be negative. Thus, the cutoff costs with n+ 1 firms must be smaller
than with n firms. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Firms participate in the auction iff xi ≤ xˆ. If n > k,
type xˆ wins iff m ≤ k and, by (P4), type xˆ can then bid to receive the maximum
payment r. Type xˆ’s expected profit from the auction is, with G(x) = F(k,n−1)(x),
pi(xˆ, r, c, n) = (r − xˆ)(1− G(xˆ)) = c (see (1) and the proof of Lemma 1). If n ≤ k,
pi(xˆ, r, c, n) = r − xˆ.
If n > k, we assume symmetric, strictly monotone equilibrium bidding functions
(P5). Denote by pi(x, z) the expected profit of a firm of type x ≤ xˆ who bids as if
her type was z. Let p(z) denote the payment to a firm who bids like type z. To
maximize
pi(x, z) = p(z)− (1−G(z))x for all x, z ∈ [x, xˆ] ,
we derive the first-order condition
d
dz
pi(x, z) =
d
dz
p(z)− g(z)x = 0 for all x, z ∈ [x, xˆ] .
In equilibrium, z = x, and, thus
d
dy
p(y) = g(y)y for all y ∈ [x, xˆ]
=⇒ p(x) = const +
∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy
= (1−G(xˆ)) r +
∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy for all x ∈ [x, xˆ] .
Therefore, the expected profit
pi(x, r, c, n) = (1−G(xˆ)) r +
∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy − (1−G(x))x for all x ∈ [x, xˆ] ,
is the same for all auctions that assign goods to the same types (P5) and in which
a firm can bid to receive r if m ≤ k (P4).
If n ≤ k, pi(x, r, c, n) = r− x for all x ∈ [x, xˆ] in all auctions with property (P4).

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Proof of equilibrium bidding functions: If n > k, pi(x, r, c, n) = (1−G(xˆ)) r+∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy − (1−G(x))x for all x ∈ [x, xˆ] by payoff equivalence (Lemma 2).
In a uniform-price auction, if all bidders bid according to β(x, r) = x, a firm
with type x ≤ xˆ wins and has costs x if she is among the k lowest types, which
has probability 1 − G(x). She receives the payment r if no more than k firms
participate, which has probability 1−G(xˆ). Her payment is equal to her opponents’
k-th lowest bid if more than k firms participate but she is among the k lowest types.
Her expected payment from these cases is
∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy. Thus, her expected profit is
(1−G(xˆ)) r + ∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy − (1−G(x))x.
In a pay-as-bid auction, if all bidders bid according to βPaB(x, r), a firm with
type x ≤ xˆ wins, has costs x, and receives the payment βPaB(x, r) iff she is among
the k lowest types, which has probability 1−G(x). Therefore, her expected payment
is
(1−G(x))βPaB(x, r) = (1−G(x))x+ (1−G(xˆ))(r − xˆ) +
∫ xˆ
x
(1−G(y)) dy
= (1−G(xˆ)) r +
∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy ,
where the last step uses partial integration,
∫ xˆ
x
(1 − G(y)) dy = [(1−G(y))y]xˆx +∫ xˆ
x
g(y)y dy.
If n ≤ k, pi(x, r, c, n) = r − x for all x ∈ [x, xˆ] by payoff equivalence. Bidders
receive the payment r by bidding x (or r) in a uniform-price auction and by bidding
r in a pay-as-bid auction. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We will prove parts O1 to O4 of Proposition 3 consec-
utively.
O1 Auctioneer’s surplus. We use standard mechanism design arguments (e.g., My-
erson, 1981; Krishna, 2010) to derive optimal mechanisms when firms have to bear
participation costs in order to bid. Let qp(xi), q
p : [x, x¯] → [0, 1], define a firm’s
participation probability as a function of her costs xi, let q
g
i (x), q
g
i : [x, x¯]
n → [0, 1]
denote firm i’s probability of getting an item when the costs x are announced condi-
tional on i’s participation, and let pi(x), pi : [x, x¯]
n → R denote the payment to firm
i when the costs x are announced. The firms send messages x to the mechanism.
The mechanism designer chooses a mechanism (qp, (qg1 , q
g
2 , . . . , q
g
n), (p1, p2, . . . , pn))
to maximize his expected surplus, taking the firms’ (interim) individual rationality
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(IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints into account. His problem is
max
(qp,(qg1 ,q
g
2 ,...,q
g
n),(p1,p2,...,pn))
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi)q
g
i (x)v − pi(x) dH(x)
s.t. (IR), (IC)
0 ≤ qp(xi) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ qgi (x) ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
qgi (x) ≤ k
whereH(x) denotes the joint distribution of the individual cost distributions, H(x) =
Πni=1F (xi) and H−i(x−i) = Πj 6=iF (xj).
A firm i’s (interim) expected payoff from reporting xi when supply costs are xi
is
Πi(xi) =
∫
pi(x)− qp(xi) (qgi (x)xi + c) dH−i(x−i) . (A.8)
The IR constraint and the IC constraint, which ensure truthful reporting of xi, are
Πi(xi) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ [x, x¯] (IR)
Πi(xi) ≥
∫
pi(x
′
i,x−i)− qp(x′i) (qgi (x′i,x−i)xi + c) dH−i(x−i) ∀xi, x′i ∈ [x, x¯] . (IC)
Furthermore, define firm i’s (interim) expected probability of getting a good condi-
tional on i’s participation
Qi(xi) :=
∫
qgi (x)dH−i(x−i) .
Condition (IC) implies, for all xi and x
′
i
Πi(xi) =
∫
pi(xi,x−i)− qp(xi) (qgi (xi,x−i)xi + c) dH−i(x−i)
≥
∫
pi(x
′
i,x−i)− qp(x′i) (qgi (x′i,x−i)xi + c) dH−i(x−i)
=
∫
pi(x
′
i,x−i)− qp(x′i) (qgi (x′i,x−i)x′i + c) dH−i(x−i)
+
∫
qp(x′i) q
g
i (x
′
i,x−i)(x
′
i − xi)dH−i(x−i)
= Πi(x
′
i) + q
p(x′i)Qi(x
′
i)(x
′
i − xi) .
Thus, for xi > x
′
i,
Πi(xi)− Πi(x′i)
xi − x′i
≥ −qp(x′i)Qi(x′i)
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and for xi < x
′
i,
Πi(xi)− Πi(x′i)
xi − x′i
≤ −qp(x′i)Qi(x′i) .
Therefore, (IC) implies that
dΠi(xi)
dxi
= −qp(xi)Qi(xi)
and, by integration,
Πi(xi) = consti +
∫ x¯
xi
qp(z)Qi(z) dz. (A.9)
Using (A.8) and (A.9) we can rewrite the auctioneer’s expected surplus with incen-
tive compatible payoffs of firms as
Π0 =
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi)q
g
i (x)v − pi(x) dH(x)
=
∫ [ n∑
i=1
qp(xi)q
g
i (x)v − pi(x) +
∫
pi(x)− qp(xi) (qgi (x)xi + c) dH−i(x−i)
]
dH(x)
−
∫ n∑
i=1
Πi(xi) dH(x)
=
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi) [q
g
i (x)(v − xi)− c] dH(x)−
n∑
i=1
consti
−
∫ n∑
i=1
∫ x¯
xi
qp(z)Qi(z) dz dH(x)
=
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi) [q
g
i (x)(v − xi)− c] dH(x)−
n∑
i=1
consti
−
n∑
i=1
∫
F (xi)
f(xi)
qp(xi)Qi(xi) dH(x)
=
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi)
[
qgi (x)
(
v − xi − F (xi)
f(xi)
)
− c
]
dH(x)−
n∑
i=1
consti ,
where in the next-to-last step we interchanged the order of integration in the hind-
most integral.28 To maximize his surplus, the auctioneer will choose consti as low as
28
∫ ∫ x¯
xi
qp(z)Qi(z) dz dH(x) =
∫ ∫ x¯
x
∫ x¯
xi
qp(z)Qi(z) dz dF (xi) dH−i(x−i) =∫ ∫ x¯
x
∫ z
x
qp(z)Qi(z)dF (xi) dz dH−i(x−i) =
∫ ∫ x¯
x
qp(z)Qi(z)F (z) dz dH−i(x−i) =
=
∫ ∫ x¯
x
qp(z)Qi(z)F (z)
f(z) dF (z) dH−i(x−i) =
∫ qp(xi)Qi(xi)F (xi)
f(xi)
dH(x).
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possible which is zero because (IC) (i.e., (A.9)) and (IR) bound consti to zero from
below.
Thus, the auctioneer’s problem can be written as
max
(qp,(qg1 ,q
g
2 ,...,q
g
n),(p1,p2,...,pn))
∫ n∑
i=1
qp(xi)
[
qgi (x)
(
v − xi − F (xi)
f(xi)
)
− c
]
dH(x)
s.t. 0 ≤ qp(xi) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ qgi (x) ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
qgi (x) ≤ k
We assume that xi +
F (xi)
f(xi)
is increasing in xi. Thus, either there exists a unique
x˜ < x¯ such that v − x˜ − F (x˜)
f(x˜)
= 0 and v − xi − F (xi)f(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi ≤ x˜, or we have
that v − xi − F (xi)f(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ [x, x¯], in which case x˜ = x¯. Conditional on
participation, the auctioneer will choose qgi (x) = 1 for the at most min{n, k} firms
with the lowest xi ≤ x˜, and qgi (x) = 0 for the remaining firms. Thus, for firms that
participate and have xi ≤ x˜, we get
Qi(xi) =
∫
qgi (x)dH−i(x−i) = Prob{xi is among the min{n, k} lowest costs}
=
min{k,n}−1∑
j=0
(
n−1
j
)
F (xi)
j(1− F (xi))n−j−1 .
The auctioneer maximizes
max
(qp,(p1,p2,...,pn))
n∑
i=1
∫
qp(xi)
[
Qi(xi)
(
v − xi − F (xi)
f(xi)
)
− c
]
dF (xi)
s.t. 0 ≤ qp(xi) ≤ 1
by choosing qp(xi) = 1 if Qi(xi)
(
v − xi − F (xi)f(xi)
)
≥ c and qp(xi) = 0 if the inverse
holds. Because xi +
F (xi)
f(xi)
and Qi(xi) are increasing in xi for all xi < x¯, there exists
a unique xˆ ≤ x˜ such that qp(xi) = 1 if xi ≤ xˆ and qp(xi) = 0 if xi > xˆ. For
n > k, xˆ is determined by Qi(xˆ)
(
v − xˆ− F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
)
= c. For n ≤ k, Qi(xi) = 1 for
all xi ∈ [x, x¯] (by the binomial theorem (A.4)). Then, either xˆ is the solution of
v − xˆ − F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
= c, in which case xˆ ≤ x¯, or we have that v − x¯ − 1
f(x¯)
> c, in which
case xˆ = x¯. Summarizing, and, for convenience, setting Qi(xi) = 0 if q
p(xi) = 0, we
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have
qp(xi) =
0 if xi > xˆ1 if xi ≤ xˆ (A.10)
Qi(xi) =
0 if xi > xˆ∑min{k,n}−1
j=0
(
n−1
j
)
F (xi)
j(1− F (xi))n−j−1 if xi ≤ xˆ .
(A.11)
It remains to determine payment functions p1, p2, . . . , pn such that the payoff
(A.8) satisfies incentive compatibility (A.9):
Πi(xi) =
∫
pi(x)− qp(xi) (qgi (x)xi + c) dH−i(x−i) =
∫ x¯
xi
qp(z)Qi(z) dz .
Plugging in (A.10) and (A.11) gives
Πi(xi) =

∫
pi(x)dH−i(x−i) = 0 if xi > xˆ∫
pi(x)dH−i(x−i)−Qi(xi)xi − c =
∫ xˆ
xi
Qi(z) dz if xi ≤ xˆ
and we get
∫
pi(x)dH−i(x−i) =
0 if xi > xˆ∫ xˆ
xi
Qi(z) dz +Qi(xi)xi + c if xi ≤ xˆ .
(A.12)
In the case of n > k, let x(k,n−1) denote the k-th lowest of i’s opponents’ realized
costs x−i if k < n and let F(k,n−1) denote the distribution of the random variable
X(k,n−1). Note that F(k,n−1)(z) = 1−Qi(z). In the case of n ≤ k, for ease of notation
define y(k,n−1) > xˆ and F(k,n−1)(z) = 1−Qi(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [x, x¯].
Two payment functions that fulfill (A.12) are, if xˆ < x¯,
pi(x) =

0 if xi > min{xˆ, y(k,n−1)}
v − F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
if xi ≤ xˆ < y(k,n−1)
y(k,n−1) if xi ≤ y(k,n−1) ≤ xˆ
(A.13)
or
pi(x) =

0 if xi > xˆ
c if y(k,n−1) < xi ≤ xˆ
min{xˆ, y(k,n−1)}+ c if xi ≤ min{xˆ, y(k,n−1)} .
(A.14)
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Obviously, both (A.13) and (A.14) fulfill (A.12) for xi > xˆ. For xi ≤ xˆ and (A.13),
we get∫
pi(x)dH−i(x−i) = (1− F(k,n−1)(xˆ))
(
v − F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
)
+
∫ xˆ
xi
zdF(k,n−1)(z)
= (1− F(k,n−1)(xˆ))
(
v − F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
)
+
[
zF(k,n−1)(z)
]xˆ
xi
−
∫ xˆ
xi
F(k,n−1)(z)dz
= Qi(xˆ)
(
v − F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
)
−Qi(xˆ)xˆ+Qi(xi)xi +
∫ xˆ
xi
Qi(z)dz
= c+ xiQi(xi) +
∫ xˆ
xi
Qi(z)dz .
For xi ≤ xˆ and (A.14), we get∫
pi(x)dH−i(x−i) = c+
∫ xˆ
xi
zdF(k,n−1)(z) + (1− F(k,n−1)(xˆ)) xˆ
= c+
[
zF(k,n−1)(z)
]xˆ
xi
−
∫ xˆ
xi
F(k,n−1)(z)dz + xˆ− F(k,n−1)(xˆ) xˆ
= c− xi(1−Qi(xi))−
∫ xˆ
xi
1−Qi(z)dz + xˆ
= c+ xiQi(xi) +
∫ xˆ
xi
Qi(z)dz .
According to Stegemann (1996, Lemma 1), every direct mechanism in which
each firm announces its type is associated with an outcome-equivalent semi-direct
mechanism in which only participating firms announce their type.
In the semi-direct mechanism associated with (A.13), firms participate in the
auction iff xi ≤ xˆ, participating firms reveal their true costs xi, and the assignment
and payments are determined by a uniform-price rule with the reserve price v− F (xˆ)
f(xˆ)
.
In the mechanism associated with (A.14), firms participate in the auction iff xi ≤
xˆ, participating firms reveal their true costs xi and receive a payment of c, and
assignment and further payments are determined by a uniform-price rule with the
reserve price xˆ. Note that, in both cases, the optimal reserve price depends on xˆ,
and, therefore, on n. In both cases, by payoff equivalence, the pricing rule could be
replaced by any pricing rule with a monotonic symmetric equilibrium.29
29Stegemann (1996, Theorem 4) proves payoff-equivalence between symmetric equilibria of first-
and second-price single-unit auctions with bid-preparation costs.
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If xˆ = x¯, a payment function that fulfills (A.12) is pi(x) = c+ x¯. Then, all firms
participate and are paid (the reserve price) c+ x¯.
O2 Social welfare. We will first determine the socially optimal cutoff value xˆ, which
by the assumption of symmetry is the same for all firms. Second, we will determine
the reserve price that induces socially optimal participation. Third, we will describe
a second mechanism that generates the same expected welfare.
First, assume v < x¯ + c or n > k. The first-order condition of the problem to
maximize W is ∂W/∂xˆ = 0, where
∂W
∂xˆ
=− ncf(xˆ)−
min{k,n}∑
i=1
xˆf(i,n)(xˆ)
− vf(xˆ)
min{k,n}−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(min{k, n} − i)F (xˆ)i−1(1− F (xˆ))n−i−1(i− nF (xˆ)) ,
which with f(i,n)(xˆ) = nf(xˆ)
(
n−1
i−1
)
F (xˆ)i−1(1−F (xˆ))n−i and Lemma 3(A.2) and (A.3)
leads to
(v − xˆ)
min{k,n}∑
i=1
(
n−1
i−1
)
F (xˆ)i−1(1− F (xˆ))n−i − c = 0 . (A.15)
For v = r, Condition (A.15) equals Condition (1) to determine the cutoff costs xˆ.
Thus, rO2r = v attracts the participation that generates the social optimum.
Second, assume v ≥ x¯+ c and n ≤ k. Then, participation by all firms is socially
optimal and the auctioneer attracts participation by all firms with a reserve price
rO2r ≥ x¯+ c, e.g., rO2r = v.
One socially optimal mechanism is therefore a uniform-price auction with the
reserve price rO2r = v. A second mechanism that also achieves socially optimal
participation of all types x ≤ xˆ is a uniform-price auction with rO2c = xˆ and an
additional payment of c to all participants. In this mechanism, type xˆ has an
expected payoff from the auction of zero and is therefore the highest type that will
participate.
O3 Number of goods awarded. The maximum number of goods awarded is k if n > k
or n if n ≤ k. If n ≤ k, by Lemma 1, r ≥ x¯ + c achieves full participation and
the maximum number of goods awarded. If n > k, xˆ < x¯. Thus, under symmetric
participation a reserve price as high as possible maximizes the expected number of
bidders, and, therefore, the expected number of goods awarded. However, there is
no reserve price that achieves full participation.
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An optimal mechanism is therefore a uniform-price auction with the reserve price
rO3c = x¯ and an additional payment of c to all participants. Then, all participants
participate and the expected number of goods awarded is maximized. If n ≤ k, a
second optimal mechanism is a uniform-price auction with the reserve price rO3r =
x¯+ c.
O4 Auctioneer’s costs. The auctioneer minimizes his costs, that is, his payments,
by the reserve price rO4r ≤ x+ c. Then, no firm participates and the auctioneer pays
nothing. Clearly, the auctioneer has no incentive to refund participation costs. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Denote the optimal mechanism of the type Mc or Mr
when the bid-preparation costs are c by Mc(c) and Mr(c), respectively. Let Mc(c)
be characterized by the optimal cutoff xˆ and the reserve price rc = xˆ given c and let
Mr(c) be characterized by the optimal reserve price rr given c. If the costs decrease
to c′, Mc(c) and Mr(c) are still available to the auctioneer.
We compare the values of the auctioneer’s objective functions when the costs
are c′ and he chooses Mc(c) with the situation when the costs are c and he chooses
Mc(c). In the former case his objective function O1 takes a higher value because
the same firms participate but the amount c′ he has to pay to each participant is
lower. Similarly, in the former case, the objective function O2 takes a higher value
because the participants and the auction assignment and payments (other than the
reimbursed bid-preparation costs) are the same but the total bid-preparation costs
are lower.
Next, consider the value of the auctioneer’s objective function O3 when the costs
are c and he chooses Mr(c). The auction is a STD auction with a reserve price and
by Lemma 1, dF (xˆ)
dc
< 0 if n > k or r < x¯ + c. Otherwise, F (xˆ) is constant in c.
Thus, if c decreases to c′, the number of participants increases weakly. When the
number of participants increases then the number of goods awarded also increases.
When costs are c′, the optimal mechanisms Mc(c′) and Mr(c′) by definition out-
perform Mc(c) and Mr(c). Therefore, the auctioneer with either of the objectives
O1 to O3 is better off with an optimal mechanism when the bid-preparation costs
are c′ than with the optimal mechanism when the bid-preparation costs are c. 
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